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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-PREFERENCE-RIGHIT OF PRINCIPAL TO PREFERENCE ON INSOLVENCY OF BANK ACTING AS BROKER-Trust Co., as agent for

claimant to sell a mortgage, sold it to X, a depositor in Trust Co. X instructed
Trust Co. to transfer enough of her account to pay for the mortgage. Trust Co.
charged X's account, credited its "Miscellaneous Account", and sent claimant a
check on that account. Before the check could be cashed, Trust Co., insolvent,
was taken over by the Secretary of Banking. Claimant demanded a preference
over general creditors and depositors to the amount of the purchase price of the
mortgage. Held (Keller, J. dissenting), that claimant was entitled to the preference, on the ground that Trust Co. had wrongfully mingled claimant's "money"
with its own, and that the "money" could be "traced" to the "Miscellaneous
Account." Reicheldifer's Appeal, 115 Pa. Super. 454, 176 AUt. 52 (934).
The court apparently treated the present case as one involving the problem
of tracing trust funds. Practically no attention was paid to the difficulty presented by the fact that there was nothing to trace-no property,1 except the bank's
own debt,2 which could be the res of a trust, and which claimant could at any time
specify as his own. On this question the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Cameron v. Carnegie Trust Co.' and Mehler's Appeal,4 upon
which the present court evidently relied, are not in point, since in each of those
cases there was actual property of the claimant misapplied by the bank.5 The
present decision, therefore, cannot be justified unless it is sustainable on grounds
other than the orthodox principles of trust law, upon which the right to preference
is traditionally based. Where the bank acts as an agent for collection, some
courts have held that the owner of the paper is entitled to a preference even where
collection is not by receipt of property, but by a mere transfer of credits on the
books of the bank." In such cases, there is possibly some justification for disregarding trust principles :7 the depositor of the paper has, practically speaking, no
opportunity to choose the banks through which the paper will be collected and the
proceeds transmitted; and the collection of commercial paper is an established
I. "Property" for this purpose may be taken to include choses in action as well as cash
and other tangibles.
2. Aside from the difficulty of establishing a trust in the trustee's own debt [see REsTATEmENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft 293o) § 751, even if such a trust were established, claimant
would be in no better position than the general creditors, each of whom may lay claim to a
debt of the bank.
3. 292 Pa. 114, 14o Atl. 768 (1928).
4- 310 Pa. 25, 164 At]. 61g (1932).

5. The apparently convincing argument may be made that there is no practical difference
between a mere instruction by depositor to bank to apply his deposit to a certain purpose, and
an actual withdrawal of cash and immediate redeposit with the same instructions. See dissenting opinion in Larabee Flour Mills v. First Nat. Bank, 13 F. (2d) 330, 335 (C. C. A.
8th, 1926). But situations are not rare in the law where, for the sake of principle, an
apparently formal variance makes all the difference in legal result.
6. Bauck v. First State Bank, 178 Minn. 64, 225 N. W. 916 (1929) ; People v. Merchants'
Bank, 92 Hun. 159, 36 N. Y. Supp. 989 (Sup. Ct. 1895). Contra: Freiberg v. Stoddard, 161
Pa. 259,28 Atl. 1111 (1894) ; Commonwealth v. State Bank, 216 Pa. 124, 64 Atl. 923 (19o6) ;

Sherwood v. Milford State Bank, 94 Mich. 78, 53 N. W. 923 (1892).
evenly divided. Notes (1923)

24 A. L. R. 1152; (1926)

The authority is about

42 A: L. R. 754; SCOTT, CASES ON

TRUSTS (2d ed. 1931) 5i5n. Peculiar is the clash between the established Pennsylvania rule
on this point, and the decision in the instant case.
7. Cf. Note (927) 36 YALE L. J. 682, 691.

(788)
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8
and peculiar function of banks, and as such perhaps entitled to special protection.
But where the bank acts merely as an agent in a brokerage transaction, no reason
is apparent for a drastic change of established principles.9 The reason is rather
the other way. The customer has deliberately chosen this particular bank to
transact'his business, presumably because he was satisfied as to its honesty and
financial security. The business of selling securities is not a regular or peculiar
function of banks;1° and since the principle of the present decision is not likely
to be extended beyond cases involving banks, the result of granting a preference
to the banks' customers is to give such institutions an unfair advantage over their
non-banking competitors in the brokerage business. For these reasons, and in
view of the fundamental consideration that upon insolvency the primary concern
of the courts should be the preservation of the debtor's assets for distribution to
creditors,' it is submitted that the present decision was unjustified.

BANKS AND BANKING-SET-OFF-RIGHT

OF BANK TO SET OFF A MA-

TURED NOTE AGAINST A DEPOSIT IN A SUIT BY

GARNiSHoR-Defendant bank

was the holder of a demand note of the depositor. The note specifically gave the
bank a lien on all funds, etc., which belonged to depositor and came into the
bank's hands. Plaintiff secured a judgment against depositor, then brought this
garnishment proceeding. The bank attempted to set off the note against the deposit. Held, that the bank in failing to appropriate the deposit had not exercised
its lien, and so could not set off against it. Bergman Building & Loan Ass'n V.
Blaul, 175 Atl. 743 (Pa. Super. 1934), appeal argued before Pa. Sup. Ct.,
Jan. 3oth, 1935.

The relation of bank and depositor is that of debtor and creditor, and the
right of set-off between them is similar to the right to set off mutual obligations
between individuals.' As between the parties, unless they have provided other-2
wise by contract, the bank can set off only obligations which have matured.
Demand notes, however, are matured obligations from the time of their execution, 3 and so may be set off against the depositor at any time. 4 Logically, other
parties suing for the depositor's interest should be subject to the same right of
8. It is significant that the Uniform Bank Collection Code, permitting preferences not
accorded under the common law, applies only to collection of commercial paper. The Code
has been adopted in Pennsylvania. 1931 P. L. 568.
9.Compare, however, the following cases, in which preference was allowed although the
transaction involved was not the collection of commercial paper, and the bank received no
property: Leach v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 2o2 Iowa 881, 211 N. W. 536 (1926)
(instruc(collection of taxes) ; State v. McKinley Bank, 32 N. M. 147, 252 Pac. 98o (927)
tion by depositor to bank to pay third person).
io. The majority opinion in the instant case recognized this. Strangely enough, that
recognition impelled it to its decision. See instant case at 456, 176 Atl. at 53,
ii. See Slater v. Oriental Mills, 18 R. I. 352, 353, 27 AtI. 443 (1893).
x. Hammons v. Grant, 26 Ariz. 344, 225 Pac. 485 (924)

; 5 MIcHnE, BANKS AND BANK-

c. 9, § 114; I MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (Voorhees' 6th ed. 1928)
MODERN LAW OF BANKING (I9O7) 854.

ING (1932)

§ 334; 2

Bolrfw ,
2. Blum Bros. v. Girard Nat. Bank, 248 Pa. 148, 93 Atl. 940 (1915) ; Johnson County
Savings Bank v. Renfro, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 16o, 122 S. W. 37 (909) ; 5 MICnEI, BANKS AND
BANKING (1932) c, 9,§ 126. This rule had in some jurisdictions been changed by statute.
W. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c, 12, § 13. For exceptions to this rule, see I MORSE,
BANKS AND BANKING (Voorhees' 6th ed., 1928) § 329; (1917) 65 U. oF PA. L. REv. 696.
3. Dominion Trust Co. v. Hildner, 243 Pa. 253, 90 Atl. 69 (1914) ; Valiant Co. v. Pleasonton, io8 Pa. Super. 197, 164 Atl. 143 (1933).
4.Citizens' Savings Bank v. Vaughn, ui5 Mich. 156, 73 N. W. 143 (897).
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set-off as the depositor; 5 their right of action against the garnishee is based on
the latter's debt to the depositor. The Pennsylvania courts, however, had departed from these generally accepted principles 6 in the case of Valiant Co. v.
Pleasonton.7 There, the court's opinion recognized that the demand note was
matured, but created an additional requirement for set-off in a garnishment proceeding---"appropriation" 6 as wel as "maturity". The court apparently reached
this result by drawing an analogy to a situation in which the maturity of the notes
was in question. Where the contract between the bank and the depositor specifies
that the note may at the option of the bank be treated as matured on the happening of certain contingencies, and the events occur, but the bank fails to exercise
its option before a receiver or garnishor acquires the depositor's interest, the
bank cannot thereafter elect to treat the note as matured, and so cannot set it off
against the deposit.0 The decisions in this situation merely show that the bank
cannot alter its relationship with the depositor after the depositor's claim has
passed into the hands of a receiver or an attaching creditor, and are not authority
for situations like that in the instant case, in which the note was in fact matured
at the time the garnishment action was started. The instant case reaches the same
result as Valiant Co. v.Pleasonton, but instead of citing that case as authority,
the court based its decision on an "estoppel." The situation in the instant case,
however, did not satisfy the ordinary requirements of an estoppel, for there was
no evidence of any representation by the bank, and reliance thereon by the plaintiff. The chief apparent difference between the instant case and Valiant Co. v.
Pleasonton is that here the contract provided that the bank should have a lien on
all funds, etc., which came into its possession, while in the earlier case the bank
had only the common law banker's lien.' 0 But as there is authority to the effect
that such a clause does not create a lien on deposits,"- the instant case appears to
be, in all important respects, similar to Valiant Co. v. Pleasonton. This departure
from the accepted law does not appear to be warranted by the equities of the general situation. Banks extend credit in reliance on the deposits, while general
creditors often have no knowledge
of the deposits. Therefore the equities would
2
appear to favor the banks.1

5. Marble Co. v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 15 Cal. App. 347, 115 Pac. 59 (i911) ; Farmers'
State Bank v. Van Houten, 52 S. D. 528, 219 N. W. 2o6 (1928) ; 5 MICHIE, BANKS AND
BANKING (1932) c. 9,§ i2o; Shields, Set-off by Garnishee (1935) 22 PA. B. A. Q. 188.
6. Shields, Set-off by Garnishee (1935) 22 PA. B. A. Q. 188; Note (1933) 38 DICK. L.
REv. 6o; see Eaton Co. v. Mark Shoes, Inc., 37 F. (2d) 715 (E. D. Pa. 193o).
7. lo8 Pa. Super. 197, 164 Atl. 143 (1933), aff'd without opinion, 311 Pa. 587, 167 Atf.
330 (1933).
8. The court does not state just what it means by appropriation, but apparently it would
require that the bank should by definitive act place the account in such a state that the depositor could not draw against it. See instant case at 745 semble; cf. 5 MlcHIE, BANKS AND
BANKING (1932)

c. 9, § 122.

9.Corn Exchange Nat. Bank v. Locher, 151 Fed. 764 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o7); Schiff v.
Schindler, 98 Pa. Super. 207 (1930) ; (1907) 55 U. OF PA. L. REv. 430.
1o. The contract lien usually goes beyond the common law lien in providing that all
property coming into the bank's hands at any time, may be held for any debts to the bank.
The common law lien does not extend to deposits, because they represent merely a debt, not
property of the depositor.
ii. The theory is that money, when deposited, becomes the property of the bank, and
therefore the bank can assert no lien thereon. Peoples Nat. Bank v. Hewitt, 226 App. Div.
412, 235 N. Y. Supp. 392 (3d Dep't 1929) ; 5 MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING (1932) c. 9,§ 165.
But see Macon Nat. Bank v. Smith, 41 Ga. App. 438, 153 S.E. 446 (193o).
12. In the instant case the court's sympathy was probably with the plaintiff because the
particular bank in question was well protected. The promissory notes totalled $i,oon and the
bank held bonds with a face value of $3,ooo as collateral security for these notes.
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BANKS AND BANING-UNIFORM BANK COLLECTION CODE-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEPOSITOR OF COMMERCIAL PAPER FORWARDED FOR COLLECTION
AND CORRESPONDENT BANK-A check drawn on X bank was deposited by plain-

tiff in Y bank, which forwarded it for collection to defendant bank. The latter
presented the check to clearing house, paid it a balance owing on clearings after
collection, and mailed a check on A bank to Y bank. Payment on this check was
refused because of defendant's intervening insolvency. Plaintiff sought to impress a trust on the assets of defendant bank. Held, that the preference established by Section 13 (c) of the Uniform Bank Collection Code in this situation,"
does not apply to national banks, being inconsistent with the system of equal distribution established by federal law. Jennings v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 55 Sup. Ct. 394 (1935).
Correspondent banks accepting paper for collection 2 are universally considered agents at the time of such acceptance, 3 though opinions differ as to the
principal's identity. The Code adopts the so-called "Massachusetts" rule, which
acknowledges the customer as principal, 4 in contrast to the "New York" view,
which attaches the rights and duties of that status to the immediate forwarding
bank.5 Quite apart from this question of original relationship, however, may be
the problem as to whether any agency exists as of the time of insolvency. The
majority of courts regard it, in the absence of statute, as presumptively terminated by the fact of collection, the normal bank-depositor relationship of debtor
and creditor thereupon coming into existence. 6 Such a conclusion would seem to
i. Section 13 (c) provides: "Where an agent collecting bank other than the drawee or
payee shall fail or be closed for business as above, after having received in any form the
proceeds of an item or items entrusted to it for collection, but without such item or items
having been paid or remitted by it . . . the assets of such agent collecting bank . . .
shall be impressed with a trust in favor of the owner or owners of such item or items for the
amount of such proceeds and such owner or owners shall be entitled to a preferred claim upon
such assets, irrespective of whether the fund representing such item or items can be traced or
identified as part of such assets or has been intermingled with or converted into other assets
of such failed bank." This code, sponsored by the American Bankers' Association, has been
adopted in eighteen states including Illinois, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania. For a
critical article, see Townsend, The Bank Collection Code of the America* Bankers' AssociaThe code must be distinguished from the
tion (1933-34) 8 TULANE L. REv, 21, 236, 376.
proposed UN FoRm BANK COLLECTION AcT, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENcE OF
Co a IslsoNERs ON UNiFORm STATE LAWS (1933) 209.
2. Where a bank purchases paper, the customer has no further right in it, complete title
having passed to the bank. The most important factor determining whether the paper is accepted for collection or purchased is the character of the indorsement placed thereon by the
customer. Bassett v. Mechanics' Bank, 273 Atl. 228 (Conn. 1934) ; National Bank v. Hubbell, II7 N. Y. 384, 22 N. E. 1O31 (1889) ; Baker, Bank Deposits and Collections (1912) 11
MicH. L. REv. 210, 225 et seq.
3. IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, Supp. 1929) c. 15, § 3861.2; First Nat. Bank v. Bank of
Monroe, 33 Fed. 4o8 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1887); People v. People's Bank, 353 Ill. 479, 187
N. E. 522 (1933).

4. Dorchester Bank v. New England Bank, i Cush. 177 (Mass. 1848) ; Mechanics' Bank
v. Earp, 4 Rawle 383 (Pa. 1834) ; Winchester Milling Co. v. Bank of Winchester, 12o Tenn.
A slight majority view, this would seem preferable to the "New
225, II S. W. 248 (19o7).
York" rule in that it places the loss more appropriately, the forwarding bank not being made
to suffer for the negligence or bankruptcy of its correspondent, nor forced into a position
analogous to that of a guarantor.
5. Exchange Nat. Bank v. Bank, 112 U. S. 276 (1884) ; Saint Nicholas Bank v. State
Nat. Bank, 128 N. Y. 26, 27 N. E. 849 (1891) ; Mackersy v. Ramsays, 9 C. & F. 818 (H. L.
1843). As a practical matter, this rule is meaningless since banks accepting paper for collection in such jurisdictions stipulate that they shall not be liable for the negligence or insolvency of correspondents selected with due care. See (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 294.
6. Indiana, where all the facts of the transaction in the instant case occurred, so held
before adoption of the code. Union Nat. Bank v. Citizens' Bank, 153 Ind. 44, 54 N. E. 97
(x899). Contra: Nurse v. Satterlee, 81 Iowa 491, 46 N. W. 11o2 (i89o) ; Wallace v. Stone,
io7 Mich. i9O, 65 N. W. 113 (1895) ; see Note (1923) 72 U. Or PA. L. REv. 56, 6o.
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rest upon the parties' impliedly contemplating a customary commingling of collection proceeds with other resources of the bank, and payment by check or draft
upon such funds-a substitution of the bank's own obligation for the collection
proceeds. It is true that the Code does not require collecting banks to secure
payment in legal tender.'
But this statutory permission to effect collection
through the clearing house did not make the collection method here employed
equivalent to cash payment for the purpose of identifying a res sought to be subjected to a trust. The defendant received no proceeds in fact, but merely a reduction of liabilities by set-off. Its assets available for distribution in the hands of
the receiver were not increased." In view of these considerations, it is not surprising that the Court refused to accept Section 13 (c) of the Code, which
declares a trust in the assets of insolvent collecting banks for the owners of collection items whose debts remain unsatisfied after collection of the paper, regardless of the possibility of tracing the funds representing such items. State statutory
establishment of preferences in the absence of the traditional equitable basis
therefor (i. e., tracing of proceeds received) is thus held so contrary to federal
law as not to apply to national banks.9 In sounding what may well be the virtual
death knell of this section, the Supreme Court eliminated what was probably the
political price paid for passage of the Code-a price which may have constituted
the principal obstacle to the rapid universal adoption of its otherwise generally
sound provisions placing collection risks on the owners of collection items.' 0

BILLS AND NoEs-REQUISITES AND VALIDITY-PROMISE TO PAY LIRES AS
A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Plaintiff declared on an instrument made by de-

fendant wherein defendant promised to pay "15,400 lires." The note was made
and payable in New Jersey. Defendant moved to strike out the complaint on
the ground that no consideration was alleged. Held, that the instrument declared
on was a negotiable promissory note, and therefore required no allegation of
consideration. Incitti v. Ferranteand Yuliano, 12 N. J. Misc. 840, 175 Atl. 9o8
(1933).1
7. IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, Supp. 1929) c. I5,§ 3861.9. In the absence of statute or
special agreement, a collecting bank is liable for negligence if it accepts in payment anything
other than legal tender. Fed. Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. x6o (1924).
8. See the lucid opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in-the instant case at 398.
9. The various preferences established by § 13 of the Code sacrifice the interests of depositors and general creditors of small correspondent banks to those of large city banks, which
customarily deposit much paper for collection. Many state courts, perceiving the real nature
of this section, have restricted its application and even misapplied it. Cf Reichert v. Fidelity
Bank and Trust Co., 261 Mich. 107, 245 N. W. 8M8 (1932) ; Malcolm v. Trust Co., 115 N.
J. Eq. 227, 17o AtI. 32 (934).
Others have followed the law as they found it. Prudden &
Co. v. Bank, 115 N. J. Eq. 365, 17o Atl. 86o (934) ; It re Mechanics' Trust Co., ig D. & C.
468 (Pa. 193).
io. See note 9, supra. The court naturally left undecided the problem of whether the
statute was intended to create a trust in the proceeds after collection. as distinguished from a
trust in the debt of collecting bank to the immediately forwarding bank arising upon collection. The lower court in the instant case, 71 F. (2d)' 618 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), apparently
adopted the former view, though it did not mention § 13 of the Code. In jurisdictions that
will adhere to the strict interpretation of the section, this may be a serious problem.
i. Though decided in February, 1933, the instant case was not reported until January,
1935.
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A negotiable promissory note must contain a promise to pay money.2 Accordingly, an instrument reciting a promise to pay a commodity, such as "one
ounce of gold", is not negotiable. 3 A promise to pay in this country an amount
in the medium of foreign money is a promise to deliver a commodity.4 However,
a promise to pay in this country an amount of dollars as measured by a certain
number of units of foreign monetary value is a promise to pay money. Where,
as in the instant case, the instrument merely states an amount in units of foreign
monetary value-as distinguished from a statement of specific foreign coins or
paper bills"-it is reasonable to interpret the agreement as payable in dollars, the
amount of which is measured by the statement of the foreign money.7 It would
seem, therefore, that the instant court reached the correct result in this regard.
A further and perhaps more difficult problem is concerned with the requirement
that the amount be certain.$ Conceding that the promise was to pay United
States dollars in an amount measured by "15,400 lires", 9 it would seem that the
fluctuation in the rate of exchange made the amount payable highly uncertain. 0
2.

This is the rule both at common law and under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
LE INsTRumENTs (7th

NoRTo N, BULs AND NoTs (4th ed. 1914) §§ 21-25; DANIEL., NEGom
ed. 1933) § 6I; NEco mA.BLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § I (2).

3. Roberts v. Smith, 58 Vt. 492, 4 AtI. 7o9 (1886). It was early decided that a promise
to pay "kIoo currency, payable in tobacco?', was not negotiable. Hodges v. Clinton, i N. C.
53 (1792-) ; cf. Mather v. Kinike, 51 Pa. 425 (I866).
4. Thompson v. Sloan, 27 Wend. 71 (N. Y. 184o). Contra: King v. Hamilton, 12 Fed.
478 (C. C. D. Ore. 1882). See Oliphant, The Theory of Money in the Law of Comnercial
Instrumnents (1920) 29 YALE L. J.6o6, 62o, wherein the author distinguishes between foreign
money which is "current" at the place of payment and foreign money which is not there "current." In the former case he suggests that the instrument be held commercial on the theory
of "currency" as the basic test for negotiability as distinguished from "tenderability". Even
in the latter case, Professor Oliphant argues, the instrument ought td be held negotiable in
the interest of the necessities of foreign trade, ". . . if the foreign money in question is
that of one of the recognized nations of the world engaged in international trade." Where,
however, the promise is to pay in the foreign medium, if the note is payable in the foreign
country, it is a promise to pay money. Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 191 (1873) ; Hebblethwaite
v. Flint, 185 App. Div. 249, 173 N. Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dep't i918); Greenwood v. Foley, 22 U.
C. C. P. 352 (Can. 1872) (payable in United States in United States money, sued on in Canada) ; Third Nat. Bank v. Cosby, 43 U. C. Q. B. 58 (Can. 1878).
5. NORTON, loc. cit. supra note 2.
6. The lira is the Italian unit of monetary value, as the dollar is in this country, the franc
in France, and the pound sterling in England. These are to be contrasted with specific coins,
such as the eagle in this country and the sovereign in England.
7. Norton states dogmatically, "In the absence of a specific detignation of a medium of
payment, the instrument is construed as calling for the payment of money of the country in
which it is payable; the sum of foreign money stated is taken to be an indirect way of expressing the amount of money [of the place of payment] to be paid." NoRTON, op. cit. supra
note 2, §§ 21-25. See also Oliphant, supra note 4, at 61g, "The fair meaning probably is that
the instrument calls for money of the country where payable."
8. NzmoTnrBE I=RsTumENTS LAW § x (2).
9. Since the instant case was decided in February, 1933, the note involved must have been
due before the United States departed from the gold standard. The court held the sum to
be certain on the theory that the amount of lires set forth could be readily translated into dollars by referring to the quarterly estimate of the value of foregn coins issued by the Secretary of the Treasury as required by 28 STAT. 552 (1894). This Act of 1894 has been amended
several times. See 46 STAT. 739, 31 U. S. C. A. § 372 (1934), which provides that if the
estimate varies by more than five per cent. from the New York buying rate the price at New
York is to prevail.
1o. The official quarterly proclamations from April, 1931, to April, 1934, list the following estimates (in dollars) : lira-.0526; franc-.0392; pound-4.8665. Following are the fig-

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

This would appear especially so with respect to the same instrument made today,
in the light of such recent developments as the abandonment of the gold standard
by the United States and the power recently granted the President to alter the
gold value of the dollar within certain restrictions." So uncertain would the
it is questionable whether
amount due be at the time of making the note, that
2
such an instrument would now be held negotiable.'

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-STATE CONTROL-USE OF "RESERVE
POWER" CLAUSE IN STATE CONSTITUTION TO FORBID TRANSMUTATION INTO
FEDERAL ORGANISM-In an original action, begun by permission in the Supreme

Court of Wisconsin, the Banking Commissioner of that state sought to exercise
his statutory prerogative to liquidate the defendant building and loan association,'
which he claimed had violated its charter in attempting without the state's permission to convert itself into a federal savings and loan bank, under the Federal
Home Owners' Loan Act, as amended. 2 Held, that the desired order must issue,
because the action of the association was in violation of its charter, and therefore
void. State ex rel. Cleary v. Hopkins Street Building and Loan Association, 257
N. W. 684 (Wis. 1934)V
The chief staff upon which the decision leaned was the "reserve power"
clause of Wisconsin's Constitution 4 -a weapon which was designed 5to counteract
the numbing effect of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward upon subsequent control by legislatures over their own creatures. Such specific reservation
of power to alter the terms Qf a charter has been held to be sufficient to permit
for the ten-year period beginning in 1924, representing the yearly averages of foreign
rate of exchange in lires, francs and pounds (in cents per unit of foreign currency):
Pound (par 486.66)
Franc (par 3.92)
Lira (par 5.26)
441-7064
5.2368
1924-4.358o
482.8944
4.7671
1925-3.9776
485.8235
3.2427
1926-3.8894
416.1024
3.9240
1927-5.156o
486.6223
3.9210
1928-5.2571
485.6879
3.9161
1929--5.2334
486.2126
3.9249
1930-5.2374
4534990
3.9200
1931-5-2063
350.6067
3.9276
1932-5.1253
423.682r
5.0313
1933-6.7094
503.9302 (new par 823.97)
6.5688 (new par 6.63)
1934-8.5617 (new par 8.9112)
The above figures are those released in the FEDERAL RESERVE BU.TrIN, Jan., 1935, p. 49, and
are based on actual cable transfers in New York.
ii. The President's proclamation of January 31, 1934, fixed the domestic gold price of
the dollar at 59.06 per cent. of its old par value.
12. As an example of the uncertainty involved see foreign exchange quotations as of
February 28, 1935: lira (par 8.9112 cents per lira)--8.52A; franc (par 6.6335 cents per
franc)-6.65/; pound (par 8.2397 per sovereign)-$4.834. N. Y. TImES, Feb. 28, 935.

ures

I. WIs. STAT. (1933) § 215.01 et seq.
2*.
48 STAT. 646, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1464 (i)

(Supp. 1934), amending 48 STAT. 128, 12 U. S.
C. A. § 1461 et seq. (Supp. 1934). The transmutation may be accomplished by a vote of
fifty-one per cent. of the shareholders present at a meeting called for that purpose.
3. With this case were tried two appeals by the commissioner from orders forbidding his
interference with similar conversions by two other building and loan associations. These
orders were reversed.
4. WIs. CoNsT. art. ii, § I. "All general laws or special acts enacted under the provisions of this section [authorizing creation of corporations] may be altered or repealed by the
" legislature at any time after their passage."
5. 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819).
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7
This provision, said the
changes, 6 which otherwise would be unconstitutional.
retain control over the
shall
legislature
the
that
intention
an
clearly
shows
court,
creatures it brings into being; the act of this association, one of the state's creations, must be under some power given by the legislature-it cannot acquire that
power elsewhere; but the legislature under the constitutional provision may~not
relinquish the control it ivas intended to retain, nor may it empower the corporation to escape that control. Any such construction of a bare reservation is
strained. But additional support was sought in an undisputed limitation upon the
legislature's exercise of the "reserve power"-namely, that it may not be used to
the destruction of vested rights." The court found that this permissive alteration
in the charter by less than an unanimous vote of shareholders destroyed vested
rights of the dissenters in the features of Wisconsin's system of protection and
safeguards; and finally, that this was a fundamental and radical change-from
the state to the federal sovereign-and was therefore forbidden over the dissent
of a single shareholder. But even granting the premised limitation, should such
rights of shareholders be regarded as "vested", and does such a change result
in their destruction? Is a change of sovereignties which are coming more and
more to overlap, properly held to be "fundamental"? And the spectres raised are

finally laid by the utter absence of record of any dissenters in this case. Moreover, opposed to this specious, if ingenious, use of the "reserve power" clause is
the healthy policy behind the federal enactment, and the seemingly conclusive
analogy between the present statute and the provision 'for conversion of state
banks into national banks, which was a prominent feature of the National Bank
Act.9 The power of a bank to work such a change was and is not disputed ;1o
the court's attempted distinction between banks and building and loan associations
is based upon irrelevant considerations in the special field of taxation, and although perhaps historically accurate, should have given way to a more careful
1
consideration of present-day similarities between the two.

COM IERCE-POWER TO REGULATE-STATE TAx ON GOODS SHIPPED FROM,
ANOTHER STATE AS BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE-A Pennsylvania stat-

ute placed a tax on all liquid fuels sold and delivered -within the state.'

Appel-

lant, a Pennsylvania corporation, sold gasoline by contracts made within the
state. Delivery was made directly to buyers in Pennsylvania by tank car shipments from Delaware. The commonwealth sued to collect the tax from appellant.
6. Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 545 (U. S. 1872); Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 489 (U. S.
1872) ; Union Pac. P. R. v. United States, 99 U. S. 700 (1879).
7. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 18ig).
8. Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412, 1o5 N. W. IO31 (19o6) (order granted restraining
reorganization of solvent corporation under statutory authority which cut off rights of existing and dissenting shareholders in corporate surplus) ; see Union Pac. R. R. v. United States,
99 U. S. 700, 719 (1879) ; Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13, 19 (1881).
9. 13 STAT. 112 (1864), as amended, 38 STAT. 258 (913), 12 U. S. C. A. §35 (927).
Io. Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 683 (1876) ; Keyser v. Hitz, 2 Mackey 473 (D. C. 1883);
State ex tel. Sorlie v. First Nat. Bank, 57 N. D. 5741 224 N. W. I6r (1929). Some functions are denied to the new national bank, although the courts recognize that no permission
by the state is necessary for the change. Petition of Commonwealth-Atlantic Nat. Bank of
Boston, 249 Mass. 440, 144 N. E. 443 (1924) ; cf. First Nat. Bank of Chattanooga v. Chapman, I6o Tenn. 72, 22 S. W. (2d) 245 (i929).
ii. See the exhaustive opinion of Tuttle, J., dissenting in Hoenig v. Huntingdon Nat.
Bank, 59 F. (2d) 479, 484 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932), for arguments fortifying this conclusion, and
for a good discussion of authority.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Pttrdon, Supp. 1934) tit. 72, § 2611d.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Held, that the tax must be paid, since the statute is not unconstitutional as imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce. Wiloil Corp. v. Com'nwnwealth of
Pennsylvania, 55 Sup. Ct. 358 (1935).
Conceding that the Court correctly held the taxing statute applicable to the
transaction in question, one is presented with the broader problem of the constitutionality of such a statute. Although the cominerce clause of the Constitution2 has always been interpreted as conferring upon Congress the "exclusive
dominion" over interstate commerce, 3 a state's power to tax goods within its
boundaries must necessarily affect interstate trade in some measure. 4 Hence
there has developed the "burden theory"-that a state may regulate interstate
commerce if such regulation does not impose any "direct and substantial burden"
thereon.5 Existence of such burden is an essentially practical question, "depending for its decision on the special facts of each case." 6 Factors always to be considered are whether the statute is primarily aimed at internal revenue or at
interstate regulation 7 whether in intent or operation it discriminates against
goods produced in or transported from another state," and whether its general
effect is to obstruct the free flow of intercourse between the states. 9 Some more
or less analogous situations previously presented to the Court, in each of which
the contract had been made in a particular state by citizens thereof, are: (i)
where the contract involved the vendor as the representative of a foreign corporation; 10 (2) where the contract necessarily involved prior delivery to the vendor
from outside the state; 11 and (3) where the contract involved the sale of
"futures." 12 But in adjudicating the present question the Court was not compelled by any former decision, for the factual circumstances were distinguishable
from all of those heretofore arising. Consequently it is unfortunate that vague
language in the opinion precluded a clear statement of principles which could be
utilized in future. 3 But any constitutional controversy should be resolved in
favor 6f the statute; :" and furthermore, an opposite conclusion would have
S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. See Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactionsin Interstate Commnerce (1934)
2. U.

12

N. C.

L. REv. 99, n. i.
4. See Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 505 (1922) ; Brown, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 247, 248.
5. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Kentucky, 231 U. S. 394 (1913) ; see United
States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 326 (1918) ; Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. I,
8 (933) ; GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932) §§ 93 (c), i69.
6. Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290, 294 (1922).
7. liNd; Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 95 (934).
8. See Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 140 (U. S. 1868) ; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing
Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 497 (1887) ; cf. American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 522
(904).
9. See Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 63o (1885) ; Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1,
8 (1933).
io. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 5o6 (1923) ; cf. Robbins v. Shelby Taxing
Dist., 120 U. S. 489 (1887) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Kentucky, 231 U. S.
394 (1913).
ii. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. I (933) ; cf. Banker Bros. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U.
S. 21o (1911).
But cf. Federal Trade Comm. v. Pacific Paper Ass'n, 273 U. S. 52 (927).
12. I. e., "those purely speculative transactions, in which there is a nominal contract of
sale for future delivery, but where in fact none is ever intended or executed." 2 BouVIR,
LAW DIcr. (Rawle's 3d revision, I914) 1328, tit. "Futures". Ware & Leland v. Mobile
County, 209 U. S. 405 (19o8); cf. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593
(1926).
13. The opinion by Schaffer, J., in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decision of the
principal case is more lucid generally, but hardly more enlightening in this respect. Commonwealth v. Wiloil Corp., 316 Pa. 33, 173 At. 404 (1934).
14. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 625 (U. S. 18ig);
WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW -(2d ed. 1929)
§§ 26, 27; Corwin, Judicial Review in
Action (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 639, 645.
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afforded vendors an easy method of avoiding many state taxes. Therefore the
result actually reached seems satisfactory.

CRIMINAL LAW--TRIAL-DuTY OF COURT TO ADVISE MINOR DEFENDANT
OF RiGHT TO HAVE COUNSEL-Defendant, fifteen years old, was charged with

first degree murder. The day he was arrested, without the knowledge of his
father 1 or benefit of counsel, and without being advised of his right to have
counsel, he confessed and pleaded guilty. After examining defendant and several witnesses, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed
on the ground that he had not been advised of his right to be represented by
counsel. Held (one justice dissenting), that failure to advise defendant of his
privilege of having counsel was not error.2 People v. Crandell, 258 N. W. 224
(Mich, 1935).
The Bill of Rights grants every defendant the privilege of being defended
by counsel.3 This does not apply to proceedings in state courts, 4 but every state
However, deconstitution, with one exception, 5 contains a similar provision.
fendant may waive this privilege and defend in person. 6 Some cases have held
that if accused does not request counsel he has impliedly waived his privilege, and
therefore his rights are not violated by proceeding without counsel. 7 In other
cases, the same result has been reached by holding that it will not be presumed
that the privilege was denied defendant merely because it is not shown to have
been accorded him., On the other hand, some cases have declared that it is
the duty of the court to inform accused of his privilege, and that if he is not so
informed, and proceeds without counsel, there is error. 9 Obviously, no general
rule can be stated categorically. When, however, all the surrounding circumstances of each case are examined, it appears that there are several chief factors
which may influence the courts. The gravity of the offense is often considered;
I. When a minor is arrested and placed on trial, no notice to his parents is necessary un-

less expressly required by statute, Richardson v. Dunn, 128 Me. 316, 146 Ati. 9o4 (1929).
But cf. Whitten v. State, 8z Fla. 18r, 89 So. 421 (i921).
2. The court relied upon People v. Williams, 225 Mich. 133, 195 N. W. 818 (1923). In
that case, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that the right to have counsel assigned at
public expense is contingent upon a request by accused and proof by him that he is without
funds. The question raised by the Williams case was therefore esssentially different from
that involved in the instant case.
3. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. VI.
4. Perkins v. Sheriff of Calcasieu Parish, 23 F. (2d) 892 (W. D. La. 1927) ; McDonald
v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 53 N. E. 874 (1899) ; see State v. Murphy, 87 N. J. L. 515,
530, 94 Atl. 640, 646 (1915).
5. Virginia. For a list and classification of the pertinent provisions in the state constitutions, see CODE OF CRMINAL PRocsuumRU COmmENTARIES (Am. L. Inst. 193o) § 39.
6. Phillips v. State, 162 Ark. 541, 258 S. W. 403 (924) ; Cutts v. State, 54 Fla. 21, 45
So. 491 (i9o7) ; see Sahlinger v. People, 1O2 Ill. 241, 246 (1882). Thig applies equally to
minor defendants. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 401, 136 N. E. 241 (1922); .EX
parte Barton, 32 Okla. Cr. R. 41, 239 Pac, 944 (1925).
64 U. OF PA. L. REv.
7. Gatlin v. State, 17 Ga. App. 4o6, 87 S. E. I51 (1915), (ii6)
4oi; State v. Kelly, 25 La. Ann. 381 (1873); State v. Raney, 63 N. J. L. 363, 43 Atl. 677
(1899). However, it seems far fetched to talk of "waiver" where, as in the instant case, defendant did not even know that he had any right to waive.
8. Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. Io8 (i86i) ; Barnes v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794,
23 S. E. 784 (1895) ; State v, Yoes, 67 W. Va. 546, 68 S, E. x81 (igio).
q. People v. Miller, 123 Cal, App. 499, ii P. (2d) 884 (1932) ; Batchelor v. State, i89
Ind. 69, 125 N. E. 773 (i92o); Rivers v. State, 112 Tex. Cr. R. 65o, i8 S. W. (2d) i71
(1929) ; CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEURE (Am, L. Inst. i93O) § 39.
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there is a tendency to give the accused more protection in capital cases.'0 Moreover, it has been held that where defendant is a foreigner, illiterate, or feeble
minded, the court must, whether requested or not, assign counsel for him."Also, where defendant is a minor, the courts will take particular care to safeguard his rights." Even where defendant has pleaded guilty, the courts may
exercise discretion in setting the plea aside, and frequently do so." In all previous cases discovered, where defendant was a minor convicted of a capital
offense without having been advised of his constitutional privilege to be represented by counsel, the conviction has been set aside." The reactionary decision
in the instant case goes to an unparalleled and unjustifiable extreme.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INTERSTATE RENDITION-STATUS OF ACCUSED AS
A "FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE" WHEN BBOUGHT INTO ASYLUM STATE BY ITS
OWN AND FEDERAL OFFICERS-Relator, held in Wisconsin, was surrendered

to the custody of Illinois and Department of Justice officers who took him to
Illinois, whence he was returned to Wisconsin. Relator was then removed to
Minnesota, then back to Illinois where charges against him were nol prossed.

When arrested at the request of Wisconsin, relator sued out a writ of habeas
corpus. Held, that he was a fugitive from justice and could be rendered up to
Wisconsin. People ex rel. McFaddenv. Meyering, 193 N. E. 475 (IUl. 1934).

It is the definite tendency of courts today, in determining whether the person
demanded is a fugitive from justice, to consider the manner of leaving the demanding state as immaterial as is the motive.' This result may seem illogical in
face of the statutory provision that the person must be demanded from the state
to which "he has fled" and that he must be a "fugitive from justice." 2 But the
Constitution requires only that a "person charged . . . with . . . crime . . .
who shall flee from justice and be found in another state . . . must be delivered

up on demand." 3 The latter provision clearly excludes any requirement that the
person demanded must have sought refuge in the asylum state.4 Since the United
io. People v. Miller, 123 Cal. App. 499, 11 P. (2d) 884 (932) ; Whitten v. State, 82
Fla. 181, 89 So. 421 (1921); People v. Kurant, 331 Ill. 470, 163 N. E. 411 (1928). Contra:
State v. Butchek, 121 Ore. 141, 253 Pac. 367, rehearing denied, 121 Ore. 155, 254 Pac. 805
(1927).
ii. People v. Salas, So Cal. App. 338, 250 Pac. 526 (1926) ; Williams and Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 330, 110 S. W. 339 (i9o8); see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
45,71 (932), (933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 337. But ef. State v. De Serrant, 33 La. Ann. 979
(1881); State v. Terry, 201 Mo. 697, 100 S. W. 432 (1907).
12. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932) ; State v. Oberst, 127 Kan. 412, 273 Pac. 49o
(1929); Tipton v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. R. 56, 235 Pac. 259 (1925). But cf. Gutierez v. State,
47 S. W. 372 (Tex. Cr. App. 1898); Hayden v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 211, 134 S. W. 703
(1g1). The leading case of Powell v. Alabama, su-pra (the renowned "Scottsboro Case")
contained a number of circumstahces unfavorable to defendants. The offense was capital;
defendants were illiterate minors, surrounded by hostile public feeling, and constantly under
military guard.
13. People v. Kurant, 331 Ill. 470, 163 N. E. 411 (1928) ; Cassidy v. State, 201 Ind. 331,
168 N. E. 18 (1929) ; City of Salina v. Cooper, 45 Kan. 12, 25 Pac. 233 (3890).
14. Whitten v. State, 82 Fla. 181, 89 So. 421 (1921) ; Gardner v. People, 3O6 Ill. 76
(1883) ; State v. Oberst, 127 Kan. 412, 273 Pac. 49o (1929) ; Polk v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. R.
283, 224 Pac. 194 (924) ; Mullen v. State, 28 Okla. Cr. R. 218, 230 Pac. 285 (3924).
3. Spencer v. Hamilton, 12 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 8th, 3926) ; Hart v. Mangum, 146 Ga.
497, 91 S. E. 543 (1917) ; People v. Smith, 352 Ill. 496, 186 N. E. 159 (1933) ; State ex rel.
Shapiro v. Wall, 187 Minn. 246, 244 N. W. 8i (3932); In re Cohen, 3O4 N. J. Eq. 56o, 346
Ad. 423 (1928).
2. I STAT. 302 (793), 18 U. S. C. A. § 662 (927).
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2.
4. 2 MOORE, INTERSTATE RENDITION (i89i) 930.
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States Supreme Court has held that to flee from justice does not mean to have
fled consciously to avoid prosecution, 5 it is evidently necessary only that the
accused be charged with crime and be found in the asylum state.6 Though dis-7
tinctions have been made between voluntary and involuntary leaving of a state,
these are at best makeshift tests of determining when one is a fugitive. For
instance, where one leaves a state through coercion-e. g., to escape mob violence
-the leaving is practically involuntary." Moreover, might not an accused person
leave a state "voluntarily" in the custody of officers to answer charges in another
state which he knows cannot be proved? And where a prisoner is paroled on the
conditionthat he leave the state, the manner of leaving is obviously deemed immaterial, for the cases uniformly hold that if the parole is broken the accused can be
returned to the state which paroled him." Clearly, the consent of the prosecuting
witnesses or of the authorities of the demanding state to his leaving should be
held no defense to rendition proceedings,' for otherwise the consent would be
tantamount to a pardon. A fortiori, a consent given only to the accused's standing trial elsewhere should be no defense where the state desiring the accused to
answer charges makes sure of his appearance by guarding him when the asylum
state sends him out. In neither case have'the officers of the demanding state
the power to dismiss the charges against him, nor should their acts have that
effect solely because precautions are taken that the prisoner be present to answer
a sister state's charges. The result reached in the instant case is therefore desirable from the standpoints both of reason and policy."
EMINENT DOMAIN-NATURE AND EXTENT OF POWER-RIGHT OF FEDERAL
TO TAKE LAND FOR SLUM CLEARANCE PROJEcr-The United

GOVERNMENT

States Public Works Administration sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain I in order to acquire land in Kentucky on which to erect a low-cost housing and slum clearance project. Held, that the United-States has not this power,
since slum clearance is not a "public purpose." 2 United States v. Certain Lands
in the City of Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W. D. Ky. 1935).
5. Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 2o3 U. S. 222 (i9o6).
6. "It is sufficient if . . . when he is sought to be subjected to criminal process he
has left the jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another." People v. Smith, 352
111. 496, 5o, 186 N. E. 159, 161 (933).
See Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S4 8o, 97 (1885);
State v. Richter, 37 Minn. 436, 438, 35 N. W. 9,io (1887).
7. In re Whittington, 34 Cal. App. 344, 167 Pac, 404 (1917), where extradition was refused on the ground that the accused had left the demanding state involuntarily. This is
contra the cases cited note I, supro.
8. Glass v. Becker, 25 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
9.Ex parte McBride, io Cal. App. 251, 281 Pac. 65i (1929); Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68
Conn. 441, 36 Atl. 83o (1896) ; People v. Mallon, 218 App. Div. 461, 218 N. Y. Supp. 432 (ist
Dep't 1926) ; Ex parte Hamilton, 41 Okla. Cr. 322, 273 Pac. 286 (1929).
io. Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386 (19o8) ; Grogan v. Welch, 55 S. D. 613, 227 N. W.
74 (1929).
ii. "While it is the duty of a state to see that the rights of its citizens are protected
against illegal action arising in another state, it is of equal importance to the entire people
that the courts of a state avoid in extradition proceedings a view of their duties in that behalf
so narrow as to afford within its borders permanent asylum to offenders against the laws of
another state."

People v. Baldwin, 341 Ill. 6o4, 612, 174 N. E. 51, 54 (i93o) ; see Appleyard
203 U. S.222, 228 (i9o6).

v. Massachusetts,

I. Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 201, 202 (I933), 40 U. S. C.
A. § 4o2, 403 (1934).
2. The court was also of the opinion that no authority to condemn land for slum clear-

ance was provided by the power to tax for the "general welfare" (U. S. Coxsr. Art. I, § 8,
cl.I).
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Although before the Civil War there was some doubt that the United
States could acquire any land other than the territories, the District of Columbia
and lands purchased with the consent of state legislatures,3 it is now established that "an incident of sovereignty" of the federal government is the
power to condemn property for "public use." 4 The common law requirement of a "public purpose" has been interpreted (a) to allow any use from
which the public will benefit 5 or (b) to require that the land be used only
by the public or by public agencies; 6 but most courts have followed neither
view consistently. 7 Since no case other than the instant decision has been
found denying the right of eminent domain to the federal government on
the ground that the intended use was not "public", since the courts have
always deferred to a congressional declaration that a purpose was "public","
and since the Supreme Court, in a case involving a state's power, has taken the
liberal stand that important public benefit may be a sufficient "public use"," it
seems that supplanting slums with habitable low-cost housing should be held a
valid public purpose. The real issue concerns the constitutional power of the
United States to undertake such a project. The federal exercise of eminent
domain need not be pursuant to an express power, 10 and the national government
has been allowed wide scope in condemning land for federal purposes." The
right to tax for the general welfare might possibly be stretched by the Supreme
3. The two cases which stated that the United States had no jurisdiction to own other
lands dealt with federal title to certain lands under the Louisiana Purchase treaty. See New
Orleans v. United States, IO Pet. 662, 737 (U. S. 1836) ; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How.
212, 223 (U. S. 1845).
4. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 373 (1875) ; United States v. Jones, IO9 U. S. 513,
518 (1883).
5. Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (i9o5) (irrigation of private lands in an arid state held
a public purpose, because of the peculiar conditions within the state). See I Lwis, EMINENT
DOMAIN (3d ed. i9og) § 257; 3 NiCHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) § 40. In, following this theory the courtsare guided by the vital economic needs of the people of the state.
See ibid.; (1927) 36 YALE L. J. ii8o; cf. Greeson v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 59 F. (2d) 529 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1932) (Boulder Dam project).
6. Ferguson v. -Illinois Cent. Ry., 202 Iowa 5o8, 511, 21o N. W. 6o4, 6o6 (1926) (the
court stated that "public use" is not "public benefit") ; Haley V. Davenport, 132 Me. 148, 168
Atl. 3O2 (933) ; Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 Atl. 404
(933) ; see 2 CoLEY, CoxSTFUTioNAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 113; I LEwis, op. cit.
4upra note 5, §§ 257, 258.
7. See Brown v. Gerald, ioo Me. 351, 361, 61 Atl. 785, 789 (igo5); Albright v. Sussex
Co. Lake & Park Comm., 71 N. J. L. 303, 306, 57 AtI. 398, 4oo (1904); 1 NICHOLS, op. cit.
supra note 5, §§ 40, 45.
8. See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. R., 16o U. S. 668, 68o (1896) ; Old Dominion
Land Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 55, 66 (0925) (Congress by implication had declared
the use to be public. "Its decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility.") The National Industrial Recovery Act declared that the purpose of the public
works program was to relieve unemployment in the national emergency. 48 STAT. 195, 202
(1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 70, 40 U. S. C. A. §403 (934).
9. See Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 363, 367-370 (iqo5), cited note 5, supra.
3o. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. R., 36o U. S. 668, 683 (896),
where in upholding a condemnation of land for the Gettysburg war memorial park, the court said that
the power may be implied from all the expressly delegated powers.
ii. United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 (1883) (dam to improve the navigability of a
river) ; Chappell v. United States, i6o U. S. 499 (1895) (easement .for the unobstructed
passage of rays from a lighthouse beacon) ; United States v. 2,271.29 Acres, etc., 31 F. (2d)
617 (W. D. Wis. 1928) (land for a game reservation) ; United States v. Campbell, 5 F. Supp.
156 (S. D. N. Y. 1933), appeal dismissed, 291 U. S. 686, mnotion for rehearing denied, 293
U. S. 648 (934)
(requisition of gold bullion), noted in (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 395.
For a discussion of the power of the federal government to compete with private enterprise,
see Note (z935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 662, particularly at 665.
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Court to allow appropriations of land for federal low cost housing operations.
Still, whether or not there is a nationwide industrial emergency, there is room for
the argument that slum clearance does not require national action, on the ground
that its effects are chiefly local. It is, in fact, beginning to be undertaken by
states and municipalities.13 Therefore, although the court's reasoning in the
present case as to "public" purpose seems questionable, the decision is not unjustifiable.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-CommON LAW MARRIAGE-EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT
RESIDENCE IN COMMON LAw STATE WHEN No MARRIAGE IS RECOGNIZED IN

STATE WHERE PARTIES PURPORTED TO CONTRACT-Plaintiff and deceased entered into a marriage contract in words of the present tense, in Maryland, where
a religious ceremony is required for a valid marriage ;-but neither a religious nor
civil ceremony was performed. They returned to Pennsylvania where they lived
continuously as man and wife until the death of deceased while in the employ of
defendant. Plaintiff seeks compensation as his widow. Held, that the conduct
of the parties was equivalent to a declaration that they were husband and wife,
and was, sufficient to establish the status of marriage in Pennsylvania. Sullivan
v. American Bridge Co., 176 Atl. 24 (Pa. Super. 1935).
The Pennsylvania court artfully avoided a conflict of laws problem which
involved a difference of local social policies.' It did not declare a Maryland ceremony to be sufficient to constitute a valid marriage when the courts of that state
have declared such a marriage invalid, 2 but merely treated the Maryland ceremony
as a factor demonstrating the intent of the parties to contract a valid marriage in
Pennsylvania.3 Although mere cohabitation and reputation do not of themselves
constitute marriage, they do raise a presumption of a marriage contract,4 which
may be rebutted by proof that no marriage had in fact taken place.5 Such a
12. See note 2, supra; CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934) L49-179.
A power analogous to the one claimed by the United States in the present case is the authority, under the Federal Farm Loan Act [39 STAT. 36o, 372 (I916), 12 U. S. C. A. §§ 641, 781

(1927) ], of the Federal Land Banks to acquire lands in the course of transactions under the
Act. In the only appellate court decision that has come up under this section, the Bank's
power to hold land was not questioned, and the court held that the Bank was obligated to perform a covenant running with land acquired by the Bank. Gu~ild v. Wallis, 13o Ore. 148, 279
Pac. 546 (1929).
13. See SLuMs, LARGE-ScALE HOUSING AND DECNTRAZATION (Wash., D. C., 1932), a
report to The President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership. At pp. 14-26
it is suggested that action be taken by cities, counties or states, and the opinion was expressed
that the federal government would not have the power to issue bonds to help the states, as
such action is not within the powers delegated to the United States. At pp. 129-137 is described the success of a project undertaken in New York City.
I. A marriage valid where contracted is declared to be valid everywhere. The converse,
that a marriage invalid where contracted is invalid everywhere, has also been asserted. RESTATEMENT, CoNFLzrc OF LAWs (1934) §§ 122, 123. The converse rule is qualified in Pennsylvania in exceptional circumstances. See Phillips v. Gregg, io Watts x58, 168 (Pa. 1840) ;
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216, 223 (x934) ; Cleveland, Status in Common Law (1925)
38 HARv, L. RFv. w074, 1O76.
2. Richardson v. Smith, 8o Md, 89, 3o At. 568 (1894) ; Knapp v. Knapp, 149 Md. 263,
T3 At). 329 (I925) ; cf. Hornbake v. Hornbake, 72 Pa. Super. 6o5 (i919).
3. Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U. $. 423 (19o7) ; Bergdoll's Estate, 7 Dist. 137 (Pa. I898);
M~rich's Estate, 8 D. & C. 645 (Pa. x926) ; cf, Norcross v. Norcross, 155 Mass. 425, ;29 N.

E, 506 (1892).
4. Jackson v. Jackson, 94 N. J. Eq. 233, 113 Atl, 495 (1922) ; Commonwealth v. Stump,
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Pa. 132 (1866) ; Commonwealth V. Gray, 72 Pa. Super. 279, 284 (1919) ; Estate of Goldman, log Pa. Super. 388, 167 Atl. 244 (1933) ; Note L, R. A. 1915E 6o.
5. Hunt's Appeal, 86 Pa. 294 (1878) ; Edwards v. Enterprise Mfg. Co., 283 Pa. 42o, 129

AtI. 449 (1925),
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rebuttal has been urged by some courts to be apparent when there had been an invalid "marriage" and no later validating ceremony, such courts reasoning that the
cohabitation was in reliance on this void ceremony and therefore meretricious.,
But the better view is to suppose some mutual assent to the creation of the status,
where there had been some ceremony and the cohabitation was begun with no
intention that it be illicit,7 even though the parties deny any subsequent ceremony.,
Such an agreement would probably not be given public expression, 9 and the concept that an intent once expressed with the intent that it be effective is continuing,
fits into the policy which supports common law marriages. 10 The court could
have supported its finding by analogy to those cases which have raised the question of the existence of a status because of formal defects in the expression of
marital intent. When a marriage is attempted to be celebrated but an impediment
exists of which either or both parties are unaware, and such bar is later removed,
a valid marriage may be presumed after the removal of the bar." In the instant
case, the parties might have been looked upon as having contracted when a
jurisdictional bar existed, which bar was removed when the parties crossed the
Pennsylvania state line; when they were in a district where they were free to
contract a common law marriage, such marriage might have been presumed."2
The waiver of the requirement of express words in finding a common law marriage is a commendable liberalization of the court's attitude, so long as it is restricted to those cases where, as in the instant case, the bonc fides of the parties
are clearly established.

INJUNCTIONS-LABOR LAw-RIGHT OF LABOR UNION TO ENJOIN VIOLATION OF MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOUR PROVISIONS OF CODES OF FAIR
COMPETITION-Defendant employer discharged the members of plaintiff union in

his employ and formed a company union. The contract between the company
union and employer was in violation of the National Motion Picture Industry Code
as to wages and hours of employment.' Plaintiff union was granted a temporary
6. People v. Shaw, 259 Ill. 544, io2 N. E. lO3I (1913) (bigamy prosecution) ; Voorhees
v. Voorhees, 46 N. J. Eq. 411, 19 Ati. 172 (189o) (claim against an estate) ; Hunt's Appeal,
86 Pa. 294 (878); Hopson v. Texas, 115 Tex. Crim. Rep. 26o, 30 S. W. (2d) 311 (1930),
7o A. L. R. io26 (1931) (bigamy prosecution). See also dissent of Holmes, J., in Travers
v. Reinhardt, 205 U. S. 423, 442 (i9o7). The bigamy prosecutions may be differentiated from
the instant case, for in them the presumption of innocence operates against the presumption
of a valid marriage, while in the instant case the presumption of a valid marriage was not
contradicted by any other presumptions.
7. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 68 N. J. Eq. 736, 62 AtI. 680 (i9o5) (action for maintenance) ; Thewlis's Estate, 217 Pa. 3o7, 66 At. 519 (1907) ; Sullivan v. American Bridge
Co., 21 D. & C. 362 (Pa. 1934). For a discussion of the presumptions used to find a valid
marriage see Note (I934) 82 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 508.
8. Record of the case presented to the Superior Court, p. 22a.
9. Ward's Estate, 296 Pa. 20, 145 AtI. 676 (1929) ; Brown v. Nolen, 298 Pa. 384, 148 At.
498 (193o).
io. Hess v. Pettigrew, 261 Mich. 618, 247 N. W. 90 (1933).
ir. Petras v. Petras, 7 Boyce 290, io5 Atl. 835 (Del. Super. 1919) ; Smith v. Reed, 145
Ga. 724, 89 S. E. 815 (1gi6) ; Estate of John L. Holben, 93 Pa. Super. 472 (1928) ; Note
(igio) 9 MicH. L. REv. 54; MADDEMN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (I931) 73, 77.
12. KOEGEL, CoiMoN LAw MARRIAGE (1922) 155-i60.
i.The wages and hours provisions of the Code were included under the much debated
§7 (a) of the N. I. R. A. [48 STAT. 198 (I933), I5 U. S. C. A. §707 (a) (Supp. 1934)],
which provides: "Every code of fair competition . . . shall contain the following conditions: . . . (3) that employers shall comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum
rates of pay . . . approved or prescribed by the President."
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injunction under a State Recovery Act 2 making such codes the standard of fair
competition within the state, and authorizing private suit at the instance of "any
party whose interests are or may be adversely affected" by violation of the codes.3
Held, on appeal, that the injunction be dissolved, since the interests of the plaintiff
union were too remote to bring it within the class named in the statute.4 Sherman
v. Abeles, 265 N. Y. 383, 193 N. E. 241 (1934).
At common law it is settled that one who is injured by a public wrong may
not restrain the wrong unless the defendant's acts constitute a greater offense in
kind and in degree to the plaintiff than to the public at large.5 Even where-as in
the instant case-it is a statute which defines the wrong and creates the remedy,
those injured must bring themselves within the class named in the statute as a
condition to relief. 6 In the case of the N. I. R. A., federal district courts have
consistently refused to entertain private suits to enjoin violations of the codes, on
the theory that since the N. I. R. A. specifically confers authority upon the federal
district attorneys to restrain such violations, they are the only proper parties
plaintiff to such suits.7

On the other hand, the court in the instant case was faced

with a much broader statute with regard to the provision for enforcement. Furthermore, the New York Court of Appeals has in the past given wide judicial
sanction to labor's efforts to better working conditions." In the light of the fact
that the court has given effect 9 to its famous pronouncement in Exchange Bakery
v. Rifkin, that a union "may be as interested in the wages of those not members,
or in the conditions under which they work as in its own members because of the
2. N. Y. Coxs. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1934) § 271.
3. Id. §3.
4. The plaintiff also contended that it was entitled to relief under %I) and (2) of § 7 (a),
supranote i, which is incorporated verbatim in the Motion Picture Industry Code (Art. III,
§ i). These subsections provide that the employer shall not interfere with the right of employees to bargain collectively, and that it shall not be made a condition of employment that an
employee joins a company union. These contentions were rejected by the court for failure of
proof. By way of dictum, the court observed that § 7 (a) had not abridged the "immemorial
right" to hire and fire. It is submitted, however, that an employer who employs only members of a company union is making membership therein a condition of employment as clearly
as though the condition were expressed in words; and that if § 7 (a) is to be rendered meaningful, it will result in abridgement of the "immemorial right." See Legis. (1934) 34 Cori
L. Rxv. 1529, 1539 et seq.
5.Northern Pac. R. R. v. Whalen, 149 U. S.157 (1893); Tomlin v. Town of Las Cruces, 38 N. M. 247, 31 P. (2d) 258 (1934) ; Black v. Phila. & Reading R. R., 58 Pa. 249
(1868).
6. Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N. W. 641 (1885) ; Barrows v. Farnum's Stage
Lines, Inc., 254 Mass. 24o, 15o N. E. 2o6 (1926).
7. Purvis v. Bazemore, 5 F. Supp. 23o (S.D. Fla. 1933) ; Stanley v. Peabody Coal Co.,
1933); Western Powder Mfg. Co.v. Interstate Coal Co., 5 F.
5 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Ill.
Supp. 619 (E. D. Il1.1934) ; Progressive Miners of America v. Peabody Coal Co., 7 F. Supp.
1934). These comprise the only cases found on this point to date. The N. I.
340 (E.D. Ill.
R. A. provision for public suit by federal district attorneys under the direction of the attorney general [48 STAT. 196 (1933), I5U. S. C. A. §703 (c) (Supp. 1934)], is similar in language to the enforcement provision of the -Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 4 [26 STAT. 209 (I89O),
I5U. S. C. A. §4 (927)], under which private suit was held to be excluded by the provision for public suit. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S.48 (19o4) ; Paine
Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S.459 (1917). There has been some adverse criticism of this
interpretation of the enforcement provision of the N. I. R. A. See Rosenbaum, Enforcement
of the N. I. R. A. and Codes by Private Injunctive Proceeding (1934) 8 U. oF CiN. L. Rrv.
155; Note (1935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 240 at 245.
S. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 26o, 157 N. E. 130 (1927);
Nann v. Raimlst, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931) ; Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan,
259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); Note (1932) 46 HARv. L. Rxv. 125.
9. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin; Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, both
sitpra note 7.
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influence of one upon the other";"1 and in the light of the encompassing nature
of the statute defining the class of those who may sue, the result reached in the
instant case seems a departure from the liberal attitude of the court. The court
distinguished the Rifkin case on the ground that there the refusal to restrain
picketing although no labor dispute was afoot recognized a privilege to picket
arising out of social and industrial conditions; while here the union was attempting to assert a right against the employer that he should not be allowed to make a
contract of employment on terms less favorable to employees than those set forth
in the code. While the distinction exists, the only reason which the court mentioned for refusing, under the statute, to advance the interest of labor to the
dignity of a right, was the possibility of thereby imperilling the privileges to
boycott, strike and picket. But the creation of the right would not necessarily
mean the destruction of the privilege; for the law to allow self help (of which
picketing is a species), and a legal remedy as well, on the basis of the same legally
operative facts, is not at all unusual.1 The explanation for the result here reached
seems to lie in the court's previously announced desire to pursue a policy of
leaving the "parties to peaceful labor disputes unmolested where economic rather
than legal questions were involved." 12 It is submitted, however, that the wording
13
of the statute should have stirred the court into granting injunctive relief.
TAXATION-INCOME TAx-LIABILITY TO TAXATION OF TRANSFER OF CORIN PURSUANCE OF PLAN OF "EOR
-NIZATION"-Petitioner

PORATE SHARES

owned all the shares of the X corporation which held certain shares of the Y
corporation. For the admitted purpose of reducing the amount of income tax
on the distribution of the Y shares to herself, petitioner caused the Z corporation
to be formed and the X corporation to transfer the shares of Y to Z in consideration of Z's issuing all its capital stock to the petitioner. Three days later
petitioner dissolved Z, received the Y shares and sold them. Petitioner contended the transaction was exempt from income tax, since it constituted
a reorganization within Section 112 (i) (I) (B) of the 1928 Revenue Act.'
I0. 245 N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130, 132 (1927).

ii. E. g., the privilege of self-help is available to an owner of real property to remove
a trespasser; but he may also invoke legal, aid in the nature of damages for the trespass.
Whittaker v. Stangvick, ioo Minn. 386, III N. W. 295 (19o7); RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(1934) § 158. So, also, one is privileged to retake stolen property without the necessity of
bringing an action in conversion. Johnson v. Perry, 56 Vt. 703 (1884) ; Blades v. Higgs, io
C. B. (N. s.) 713 (1861) ; HARPER, TORTS (933) §51.
12. Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 409, 182 N. E. 63, 65 (1932).
13. In Edwards v. New York Edison Co., 149 Misc. 722, 268 N. Y. Supp. 24 (Sup. Ct.
1933), the court dismissed a suit to prevent violation of the collective bargaining provisions of
§ 7 (a) partly on the ground that the purpose of the State Recovery Act was to assist National Recovery legislation and to secure uniformity, so that since federal courts do not permit private suit a state court should not. The court apparently overlooked the statutory
ground for suit pressed in the instant case.
I. 45 STAT. 816, 26 U. S. C. A. § 2112 (g) (1928), which provides that no gain sh.all be
recognized on distribution of stock in pursuance of a plan of reorganization to shareholders of
a corporation which is a party to the reorganization; reorganization is defined [ (i) (1) (B) ]
as "a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred." Under this section petitioner contended she
was liable to taxation only on the gain represented by the difference between the fair market
value of the Y shares and her allocated basis for Z shares [see § 113 (a) (9) 19 28 Act and
U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 6oo ], and for no tax on the sale of the shares, since the fair market value was exactly equal to the sale price. The Board of Tax Appeals upheld this contention. Evelyn F. Gregory, 27 B. T. A. 223 (1932), reild sub non Gregory v. Helvering,
69 Fed. (2d) 8o9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
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Held, that the tax should be calculated upon the Y shares as a dividend from the
X corporation, because the section relied on by petitioner includes only reorganizations for business purposes. Gregory v. Helvering, 55 Sup. Ct. 266 (1935).
A taxpayer may utilize legal forms to reduce his taxes 2even if the sole
motive for such action is a desire to reduce or avoid taxation. Admitting the
validity of the general principle, the court held it inapplicable, as this transaction
was "outside the plain intent of the statute",3 everi though petitioner's actions
meticulously followed the express statutory definition.. Thus for the allowed
statutory process to constitute a reorganization, it now appears that business or
corporate reasons must be present; 4 purpose becomes decisive. Certain reports
and speeches indicate the Congress intended such an interpretation of this section; ' yet in two places in the same act where corporate purpose was to provide
the test for taxation the Congress expressly so stated. 6 It has been questioned
whether interpretation beyond the literal meaning of a tax statute is a proper
judicial function.7 Yet, as Congress has nearly exhausted its ability to prevent
tax evasion, the case illustrates the effectiveness of the courts in this regard.'

or RECOVERY OF TAX PAID
LAw-Plaintiff held a grocer's license entitling it to sell
cigarettes, but purchased a special cigarette license when informed by the clerk
of defendant city that this would be necessary, plaintiff believing that it would be
subject to fines if it transacted business without such license. In a suit to recover
money so paid, held, that plaintiff could recover, on the ground that the money
had been paid involuntarily under a mistake of law. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. City of Lexington, 76 S. W. (2d) 894 (Ky. 1934).
There is a generally recognized public policy against the recovery of taxes
once they have been paid, based on the ground that such recovery would tend to
disrupt the machinery of government;1 and hence the majority of jurisdictions2
refuse to allow recovery of taxes voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts.
Involuntary payments in response to an unlawful demand are uniformly held recoverable.3 "Involuntary payment" is generally defined as payment made under
immediate necessity to relieve person or property from seizure; 4 but some courts,
including Kentucky, hold payments involuntary if it appears that failure to make
TAXATION-REcOVERY OF TAX PAID-RIGHT

UNDER MISTAKE OF

2. See United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 5o6 (Sup. Ct. 1872) ; Superior Oil Co. v.
Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, 395 (1929) ; Jones v. Helvering, 7I Fed. (2d) 214, 217 (App. D.

C. 1934).

3. Instant case at 268.
4. Retention of assets for sufficient time might satisfy this requirement. See 34 CoL L.
RFv. 966 (1934) ; cf. George H. Chisholm, 29 B. T. A. 1334 (1934) (under a somewhat similar provision, business necessity, not merely business reasons, was held the test).
5. H. R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., ist Sess. (1924) ; 65 CONG. Rw. 2429 (1924).
6. Revenue Act of 1934, § 112 (i) [§ Ir2 (k), 1932 Act]; § go2 (b), 1932 Act; see
Hendricks, Taxation of Reorganizations (1934) 34 Co.. L. REV. 1198, 1208.
7. Hendricks, loc. cit. sicpranote 6.
8. See Tyler and Ohl, The Revenue Act of 1934 (1935) 83 U. oiF PA. L. REv. 6o7, 626.
I. See Gould v. Board of Com'rs of Hennepin County, 76 Minn. 379, 381, 79 N. W. 530

(1899).
2. 3 COOLZY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1934) § 1282.
3. Note (igo9) 22 L. R. A. (x. s.) 862, 863. The instant case differs from most cases
of unlawful demand, which are usually based upon assessments under a void statute, in that
here the statute itself was valid, although inapplicable.

4. 3 Cooiy, op. cit. rupranote 2, at 2568, n. 43, 44.
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them would have subjected the taxpayer to penalties of fine or imprisonment. 5
Such a definition would not appear to be strictly accurate where there is merely
provision for a fine, since there is no immediate compulsion, although a certain
amount of economic pressure exists. The entire question, however, involves a
balancing of the duty of the taxing sovereignty to return that which it had no
right to take and has no right to retain, as against the public policy against such
recovery. It is clear that in most instances of taxes paid through mistake, recovery would be allowed if the state were held to the standards of honesty of an
individual, and that the only ground against imposing this standard is this alleged
policy. Kentucky and Connecticut have questioned the desirability of the policy,6
the latter on the ground that there is a policy equally strong in favor of permitting
recovery, since it is to the advantage of the state that it should be able to collect
its taxes easily and promptly, and refusal to permit recovery might well produce constant resistance to collection. 7 Other courts have allowed recovery
where circumstances indicated that justice required it, on the ground that the
inequality in position made the payment in fact involuntary." While the rule is
too well established to be overthrown that there can be no recovery of taxes
voluntarily paid, these courts reach a salutary result by broadening their interpretation of "involuntary."

TAxATION-TAXATION

OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES-APPLICABILITY

OF

STATE FRANCHISE TAX MEASURED By NET INCOME To CORPORATION ENGAGED
EXCLUSIVELY IN

WORK FOR FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT-Plaintiff, a Washington

corporation engaged in general contracting and qualified to do business in Oregon, sued to recover back the amount of an Oregon tax levied on its franchise
and measured by a percentage of its net income earned on operations within the
state,' plaintiff's entire income being derived from contracts with the United
States. Held, that the tax was valid, as it neither impaired the obligations of
federal contracts, nor constituted an unwarranted interference with a function
of the federal government. General Construction Co. v. Fisher, 39 P. (2d) 358
(Ore. 1934).
States have been permitted to tax fixed assets within their jurisdiction and
belonging to private individuals, although the property was being used in performance of contracts with the federal government.2 They have likewise been
5. Underwood Typewriting Co. v. Chamberlain, 92 Conn. 204, IO2 AtI. 6oo (1917) ; Hill
v. District of Columbia, 7 Mackey 481 (D. C. 1889) ; Spalding v. City of Lebanon, 156 Ky.
.37, 16o S. W. 751 (1913); River Excursion Co. v. City of Louisville, 244 Ky. 81i, 51 S. W.
(2d) 470 (1932).

6. Bruner v. City of Stanton, io2 Ky. 459, 462, 43 S. W. 411, 412 (1897) ; Underwood
Typewriting Co. v. Chamberlain, 92 Conn. 199, 204, 102 Atl. 6oo, 6oi (917).
7. Underwood Typewriting Co. v. Chamberlain, 92 Conn. 199, 204, io2 Atl. 6oo, 6oi
(917).

8. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 286 (1912) (forfeiture of
right to do business and danger of contracts being declared illegal for failure to pay) ; Hill
v. District of Columbia, 7 Mackey 481 (D. C. 1889) (taxpayer had previously been arrested
for failure to pay license fee under unconstitutional act) ; La Salle County v. Simmons, IO
Ill. 513 (1849) (county commissioners announced they would award the license to the one

who made the highest bid, and excess necessarily paid to keep privilege) ; Catoir v. Watterson, 38 Ohio St. 319 (1882) (heavy penalty for violation of ordinance requiring license);
City of San Antonio v. Grayburg Oil Co., 259 S. W. 985 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (excess

assessment paid to prevent penalty of fine based on entire assessment).
U.

I. ORE. CODE (1930) § 69-1301 to 1330; Ore. Laws 1931, c. 273.
2. Thompson v. Pacific Ry., 9 Wall. 579 (U. S. 869) ; Gromer
S. 362 (1912) ; Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S.

v. Dredging Co.,
466 (934).
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permitted to tax the income derived from property rights granted by the United
States for private purposes.3 On the other hand, they have not been permitted
to tax contracts to which the government was a party 4 nor the income arising
therefrom. 5 Occasionally, however, states have succeeded in reaching forbidden
sources through the device-employed in the instant case--of selecting a permissible "subject matter", upon which the tax is nominally placed, while making
the "measure" of the amount of the tax dependent upon the extent of untouchable property possessed.6 It is therefore evident that no clear cut line can be
drawn to determine when income derived from federal contracts ceases to carry
with it an immunity from state taxation,r although frequently abnormal emphasis
has been placed upon the apparent "good faith" of the attempt to tax.' Each
case must represent a practical adjustment between the conflicting considerations
of allowing the federal government complete freedom in the exercise of its
legitimate powers, and, on the other hand, of allowing to the states the right
to revenue for the police and other services which they afford. It should be noted
that a tax such as that in the instant case may represent a financial as well is
political burden on the federal government. Although a tax on the net income
has a more remote effect on the contract than a tax on the gross income, yet
the fact that the entire income is received directly from the government, plus
the fact that the tax rate in the instant case involved a rather large sum of
money,9 may render even the former type of tax an extremely important factor
in evaluating the desirability of the federal contract to the contractor, and thus
the price which the government may have to pay for such work. While the
decisions present a milange of tests,' 0 the ultimate touchstone would seem to be
whether the claimed exemption will, in general, inure commensurately to the
benefit of the federal government."
3. Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379 (931) (net income included royalties from copyrights) ; Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932) (gross income included royalties from copyrights).
4. Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (U. S. 1842) (tax on the value
of a federal office) ; Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 46o (1881) (tax on every message
(assessment included value
transmitted) ; Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 24o U. S. 522 (i916)
of lease of Indian oil lands).
5. Choctaw Ry. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292 (1914) ; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501
(1921).

6. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115 (i899) (inheritance tax measured by the amount of
property devised, including government tax-exempt securities) ; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 184 U. S. iii (igol) (tax on shares of shareholders measured by proportionate value of
corporation's assets, including U. S. bonds) ; cf. Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480 (1932)
(tax on franchise measured by net income, including income from tax-exempt municipal
bonds). A corporate franchise when granted by a state is a fixed asset, and as such is properly subject to taxation. 2 CooLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 854.
7. Cf. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 184 U. S. iii (i9oi); Miller v. Milwaukee, 272
U. S. 713 (1926).

8. Ibid (tax on such portion of shareholders' dividends as corresponded to the corporate
income not otherwise assessed) ; Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 62o (1928) (state
had passed a franchise tax measured by net income but specifically exempted as part of the
measure of the tax all income from tax-exempt sources; the tax in question was levied pursuant to an amerdment repealing the exemption).
9. The rate of tax was five per cent. of the net income for the year I93O, and eight per
cent. of the net income for the year 1931 and each year thereafter (approximating an assessment of $82,ooo on plaintiff for the years 1929, i93O, 1931, and 1932).

io. Cf. Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594 (1889); Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S. 136 (1927) ; Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 5o9 (i93I). See
Powell, Indirect Encroachnents on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States
(1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 9o2, 905, 915.

II. Sufficient facts do not appear in the principal case to justify the conclusion that as to
future operations the federal government would not have to bear the primary burden of such
a tax. The burden of proof should rest with the taxing body.

